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ALL’S FAIR IN LOVE AND WAR:
BUT WHAT ABOUT IN DIVORCE?
THE FAIRNESS OF PROPERTY DIVISION IN
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH BIG MONEY DIVORCE CASES
MARGARET RYZNAR*

“A lot of people have asked me how short I am.
Since my last divorce, I think I’m about $100,000 short.”1
—Mickey Rooney
ABSTRACT
Eyebrows have recently arched not only at the high sums involved in
big money divorce cases, but also at the amount of ink spilled on this
relatively small subset of divorce cases. Yet, it is precisely in big money
cases, wherein judges have discretion over resources that significantly
exceed the needs of the parties, that fairness acquires substantial haziness.
The question of fairness is particularly acute in short marriages, as well as
when one spouse is at fault for the divorce or when one spouse contributes
extraordinarily to the marriage. Courts in both England and the United
States have been encountering these issues with increasing frequency and
differing results. The majority of American courts have employed the
principle of equitable distribution, resulting in a disproportionate property
division between spouses, particularly when the marital estate grew because
of one spouse’s extraordinary efforts. England, on the other hand, has recently implemented a yardstick of equality that aims for near equal property
division between spouses, representing a major shift in English case law
and a doctrinal break from American law. This article examines these

*Attorney, Washington, D.C. J.D., Notre Dame Law School; M.A. European Studies,
Jagiellonian University; B.A. Economics, English Language and Literature, Political Science, and
Law, Letters, and Society, University of Chicago. Many thanks to Susan Blake at The City Law
School in London, England, for her helpful guidance on English divorce law; Geoffrey J. Bennett
at the University of Notre Dame Law School, London campus, for constructive conversations on
the topic; and Margaret F. Brining at the University of Notre Dame Law School for her invaluable
input. I am also grateful for commentary from the participants at the Thirteenth World
Conference of the International Society of Family Law in Vienna, Austria, at which this paper was
presented. Finally, I appreciate the skillful editing of the members of the NORTH DAKOTA LAW
REVIEW. This article was written in my individual capacity and all opinions are my own.
1. ROBERT ANDREWS, THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 248 (1993).
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changes in the comparative context, underscoring the consequences of each
country’s interpretation of fairness in post-divorce property division.
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INTRODUCTION

Although divorce bears the brunt of many jokes, the high stakes
involved in big money marriages is no laughing matter. Beatle Paul
McCartney reportedly settled with Heather Mills for $64 million, nearly
$1800 for every hour of their marriage.2 Sumner Redstone, at the helm of
media giant Viacom, settled with his ex-wife for approximately one billion
pounds in 2002.3 Princess Diana’s settlement reportedly totaled £17.5
million.4 However, the record for the most expensive divorce may be set by
actor Mel Gibson’s recently announced divorce: he stands to lose half of
his $1 billion fortune.5 Indeed, newspapers are rich with stories of big
money divorces because, while marriage may be for richer or poorer,
separating spouses are far less financially indifferent.
Eyebrows have arched not only at the high sums involved in big money
cases, but also at the amount of ink spilled on this relatively small subset of
divorce cases.6 Critics contend big money cases lack social justice issues7
and it is therefore preferable to focus on financially ruined, fragmented
families.8 Yet, it is precisely in big money cases the words “justice” and
“fairness” acquire significant haziness.9 For example, is it fair for a highwage earner to pay an ex-spouse half of all future profits? Or, would it be

2. Jennifer Conlin, Divorce: Money Changes Everything, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/09/yourmoney/mdivorce.php?page=1.
3. Michael Moran, The 20 Most Expensive Divorces of All Time, TIMES ONLINE, March 16,
2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/most_curious/article1516355.ece.
4. Id.
5. Jill Brooke, Do You Really Think Mel Gibson Is Bothered by Giving His Wife $400
Million?, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 14, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jill-brooke/doyou-really-think-mel-g_b_186801.html.
6. See, e.g., Patrick Parkinson, The Yardstick of Equality: Assessing Contributions in
Australia and England, 19 INT’L J.L. & POL’Y & FAM. 163, 172 (2005). There is certainly no
shortage of divorce cases on which to focus; in 2003, there was one divorce for every two
marriages. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention,
National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 52, No. 22 (June 10, 2004), available at http://www.
cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52_22.pdf.
7. Parkinson, supra note 6, at 172.
8. Unfortunately, even the average divorce case can leave parties financially ruined. In 1993,
for example, the mean income for divorced American mothers was $17,859, while for divorced
fathers it was $31,034. Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional
Perspective, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 6 (1996). But see Kelly Bedard & Olivier
Deschênes, Sex Preferences, Marital Dissolution, and the Economic Status of Women, 40 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 411 (2004) (arguing that divorced women live in households with more income per
person than never-divorced women).
9. In the average divorce case, few assets remain post-division over which to fight, mooting
most questions of fairness. Another significant grey area in divorce law occurs when the only
assets are tied up with future earning capacity.
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fairer for the lower income earner to receive a smaller portion of the exspouse’s net worth, which still totals millions of dollars? Such questions
are particularly acute in short marriages or when one spouse is at fault for
the marital breakdown.
While American state courts have been encountering these problems
with increasing frequency in recent years, English courts have been
resolving them rather controversially, emerging as “the Harrods, as it were,
for those shopping for divorce jurisdictions.”10 This honor of sorts is surprising given that both the American and English legal systems share the
goal of fairness in property distribution. Indeed, the commonalities between the two systems peak in the average divorce case, when a divorcing
couple’s assets are just sufficient to meet the needs of both spouses.11 In
such cases, each spouse receives enough to cover reasonable needs, with
little surplus over which to litigate. However, it is in big money cases,
often when only one spouse contributes an extraordinary amount of money
to the marriage, that English and American divorce law diverge,
particularly since the House of Lords’ 2000 landmark decision in White v.
White.12
Importantly, the English approach has practical, direct consequences
for American divorcing couples—jurisdiction for divorce requires only the
domicile of one party.13 If one American spouse becomes domiciled in
England, it is conceivable the divorce may occur there. Therefore, many
divorce battles begin over which jurisdiction is the appropriate forum,
assuming the availability of several. This is particularly true in the European Union, where member states’ boundaries do not pose citizenship or
mobility barriers.14
The English treatment of big money divorce cases offers significant
lessons for the American legal system, particularly on the meaning of
fairness in property division. Specifically, the English experience raises
questions of whether there should be a distinction among divorcing couples
based on their financial situation, and if so, what that distinction should be.
While American law currently lacks any clear legal distinction between big
10. Conlin, supra note 2.
11. See Fact Sheet, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSA
FFFacts?_submenuId=factsheet_1&_sse=on (last visited Sept. 27, 2010). The mean income for
an American household is $46,242, usually insufficient to generate sums that would result in a
surplus after the spouses’ basic needs were met. Id.
12. [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
13. See, e.g., J. Thomas Oldham, What if the Beckhams Move to LA and Divorce? Marital
Property Rights of Mobile Spouses When They Divorce in the United States, 42 FAM. L.Q. 263,
274 (2008).
14. See, e.g., id. at 264.
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money divorce cases and the rest,15 English case law occasionally explicitly
addresses big money couples. Even the relevant terminology is lacking in
the United States, although there has been some reference to the “prodigious spouse” or the “wealthy wage earner” to describe the spouse who
contributed more to a marriage financially.16
This article endeavors to compare the American and English approaches to post-divorce property division, probing the meaning of fairness
in each jurisdiction. Part II begins by briefly surveying American divorce
law on property division, focusing on the equitable distribution principle
used by the majority of states. Part III examines the English legal approach
to big money divorces, which rests on the yardstick of equality approach.
Finally, Part IV extracts the lessons from a comparison of these legal
systems, underscoring the consequences of each country’s interpretation of
fairness in post-divorce property division.
II. THE AMERICAN MAJORITY PRINCIPLE:
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
Divorces in the United States are governed by state law, and any
generalization is difficult.17 However, post-divorce property division often
proceeds in two stages. The first is determining the assets. This is generally governed by statutory law in all states,18 as well as contract law, if the
parties entered into a premarital agreement. The second stage is the division of assets, which is also typically defined by statute.19 The principle
that governs this second stage in the majority of states is equitable distribution, which seeks an equitable, but not necessarily equal, division
between the spouses. A minority of states, however, utilize community

15. The treatment of professional degrees may be an exception. See discussion infra Part
II.D.
16. See Debra DiMaggio, The “Prodigious Spouse”: Equitable Distribution and Wealthy
Wage Earner, 91 ILL. B.J. 460, 460 (2003).
17. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (“Rules governing the inheritance of
property, adoption, and child custody are generally specified in statutory enactments that vary
from State to State. Moreover, equally varied state laws governing marriage and divorce affect a
multitude of parent-child relationships.”).
18. The details of these statutes vary among the states. For example, the relevant Illinois
statute subjects only marital property to division. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/503(a)-(b) (1993).
Furthermore, there is a rebuttable presumption that property acquired during the marriage is
marital property that is divisible upon divorce. Id. Finally, property gained before marriage or by
gift does not qualify as marital property in Illinois. Id.
19. The relevant Illinois statute is typical in providing a list of factors courts should consider
when dividing marital property, which is to be equitably divided regardless of who holds title to
the property. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/503(a)-(b).
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property, which favors a more equal property division between the
spouses.20
The well-established nature of equitable distribution in most jurisdictions, however, has hardly slowed the debate regarding the most appropriate
post-divorce property division. Instead, disagreement on this issue has
fueled litigation, challenging the proper division of property upon divorce.
Before turning to this debate, it is helpful to define terminology at the
outset. This article combines American and British semantics throughout:
the term “big money” refers to those divorce cases wherein the resources
significantly exceed the financial needs of the parties, and the term “higher
income spouse” will describe the spouse that financially contributes to the
marriage through exceptional efforts. Although in many big money cases it
is difficult to isolate one spouse as the higher income spouse because of the
equal or extraordinary nature of both parties’ contributions to the marriage,
this article mostly restricts its analysis to those big money cases that result
from the exceptional efforts of a higher income spouse.
A. THE DEBATE REGARDING EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
By definition, the principle of equitable distribution requires the courts
to divide property between divorcing parties equitably. However, such a
division does not necessarily mean an equal split between the parties;21
even a 95-5 division can be equitable.22 The generally accepted theory of
equitable division likens the division of property upon divorce to that of
partnership dissolution.23 While each partner has a stake in the partnership,
all shares are not equal. Thus, upon dissolution of the partnership, each
partner only receives the share that corresponds to his contribution. In the
marital context, however, contributions are not limited to the assets that

20. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule,
53 CLEV. L. REV. 359, 370 (2005-2006). See also, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550-56 (2007). In
the community property system, each spouse has an interest in the community property, as
opposed to separate spousal property holdings. Ira Mark Ellman, O’Brien v. O’Brien: A Failed
Reform, Unlikely Reformers, 27 PACE L. REV. 949, 951 (2007).
21. See, e.g., Alston v. Alston, 629 A.2d 70, 79 (Md. 1993). The Alston court stated:
Where one party, wholly through his or her own efforts, and without any direct or
indirect contribution by the other, acquires a specific item of marital property after the
parties have separated and after the marital family has, as a practical matter, ceased to
exist, a monetary award representing an equal division of that particular property
would not ordinarily be consonant with the history and purpose of the statute.
Id.
22. See, e.g., Bean v. Bean, 115 S.W.3d 388, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). For a useful analysis
of judicial discretion in equitable distribution divisions, see generally Sanford N. Katz, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1251 (1998).
23. BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 8:1 (3d ed., vol. 2 2005).
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each spouse brings, but also extend to those contributions made to the
marriage generally, such as child care.
In determining a particular division under the equitable distribution
approach, courts consider several legislated factors, such as the length of
marriage, the causes for the dissolution of the marriage, the age and health
of the parties, and the amount and sources of income, as well as the vocational skills, liabilities, and needs of each party.24 In these states, the courts,
therefore, have significant discretion in property division, and the resulting
decisions are often fact-specific. However, equitable distribution has triggered substantial litigation on the proper division of assets following a
divorce. The debate regarding the meaning of “equitable” is particularly
acute in the subset of divorce cases involving wealthier couples. In these
cases, property divisions are often significantly disproportionate in order to
reflect one partner’s significant financial contribution to the marriage, an
outcome that has been vigorously challenged in the courts. In such
challenges, lower income spouses25 have primarily argued that nothing
short of an equal division can be equitable—an argument embraced by the
American Law Institute (ALI) Principles.26
B. MODEL STATUTES AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION: THE ALI
PRINCIPLES AND UMDA
The ALI Principles, which cover many different areas of American
law, generally inspire some debate from the legal community.27 These
principles, although influential, do not become the law in any jurisdiction
until legislative or judicial action implements them. On the issue of post-

24. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-81 to -82 (1958); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504
(1993).
25. The wives of corporate executives, occasionally referred to as “corporate wives,” comprise one category of big money plaintiffs in the United States who are fueling litigation on the
meaning of the term “equitable.” See, e.g., Wendt v. Wendt, 757 A.2d 1225, 1230-31 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2000); McMackin v. McMackin, 651 A.2d 778, 781 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1993); In re Marriage of
Nesbitt, 879 N.E.2d 445, 447 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); see also infra note 35. Homemakers are
another category of big money divorce plaintiffs. However, the stereotypical household of a
patriarchical order is no longer necessarily true, with many women outperforming their husbands
in the workplace. DiMaggio, supra note 16, at 470; see also Whispell v. Whispell, 534 N.Y.S.2d
557, 558 (1988) (justifying the ex-husband’s low share of the marital property based on his
“negative contribution to the marriage”). Thus, it is important to underscore that the equitable
distribution principle is gender-neutral: all people who contribute an unusual amount of property
to their marriage are allowed a share that reflects their extraordinary efforts.
26. See discussion infra Part II.B.
27. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Introduction to the Symposium on the American Law
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 4 J.L. FAM. STUD. 1, 1 (2002); Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 101 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (referring to ALI’s criticism of the
best interests of the child standard).
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divorce property division, the ALI Principles28 adopt the minority American
view of property division, rejecting equitable distribution in favor of a
strong presumption of equal division.29 There are limited exceptions, such
as if one spouse commits financial misconduct.30
Despite the strong preference of the ALI Principles for equal division,
however, most states have enacted equitable distribution statutes.31 These
parallel another model statute, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act of
1970 and 1973 (UMDA). The UMDA, promulgated by the National

28. For an excellent background and commentary on the drafting of the ALI Principles in
Family Law, and on property division in particular, see Marsha Garrison, The Economic
Consequences of Divorce: Would Adoption of the ALI Principles Improve Current Outcomes?, 8
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 119, 123 (2001). “Although the American Law Institute is bestknown for its Restatements of the Law, ‘the current disarray in family law’ led the Institute to opt,
in this Project, for principles that would ‘give greater weight to emerging legal concepts’ than
would a Restatement.” Id. (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft 1997)).
29. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.15(1) (Proposed Final Draft 1997) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. Section 4.15(1) in the
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations states, “In every dissolution of marriage, the presumption arises that marital property
shall be divided so that the spouses receive marital property equal in value, although not
necessarily identical in kind.” Id. The presumption can be rebutted when: (1) it is equitable to
compensate a spouse for a “loss recognized,” in whole or in part, with an enhanced share of the
marital property; or (2) one spouse is entitled to an enhanced share of the marital property because
the other spouse previously made an improper disposition of some portion of it. Id. § 4.15(2)(a)(b). See also Craig W. Dallon, The Likely Impact of the ALI of the Law of Family Dissolution on
Property Division, 2001 BYU L. REV. 891, 892 (2001). Professor Dallon also noted the ALI
Principles distinguish themselves from the majority of jurisdictions by rejecting the discretionary
factors used in equitable distribution cases and by proposing a recharacterization of separate assets
to marital assets over the course of a long marriage. Id.
30. PRINCIPLES, supra note 29, § 4.15(2) (Proposed Final Draft 1997). Specifically, unequal
division is permitted when:
(a) the court concludes . . . that it is equitable to compensate a spouse for a loss [that
would otherwise result in an alimony award under] Chapter 5, in whole or in part, with
an enhanced share of the marital property; or (b) the court concludes under § 4.16 that
one spouse is entitled to an enhanced share of the marital property because the other
spouse previously made an improper disposition of some portion of it; or (c) marital
debts exceed marital assets, and it is just and equitable to assign the excess debt
unequally, because of a significant disparity in the spouses’ financial capacity, their
participation in the decision to incur the debt, or their consumption of the goods or
services that the debt was incurred to acquire.
Id.
31. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (2001); 13 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513
(2001); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/503 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-205 (2001); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.150 (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.16 (2000); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 236 (Consol. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105,171 (2001);
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1 (2001); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-4-121 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (2001).
For a discussion of the impact of the ALI Principles on equitable distribution, see JOHN DEWITT
GREGORY, JANET LEACH RICHARDS & SHERYL WOLF, PROPERTY DIVISION IN DIVORCE
PROCEEDINGS: A FIFTY STATE GUIDE, 2006 SUPPLEMENT 1-32-38.1 (2006).
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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,32 advocates equitable distribution of marital property at divorce, which often results in
disproportionate property divisions that trigger litigation by lower income
spouses.33 Thus, the position of the ALI Principles on post-divorce
property division remains the minority American approach.
C. THE INTERPRETATION OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION IN CASE
LAW: WENDT V. WENDT
Although American law does not distinguish among divorce cases
based on financial stakes, the division of property in high net divorce cases
has the most potential to result in a disproportionate division, especially in
equitable distribution states. Specifically, the higher income earner typically receives a larger amount to reflect a higher marital contribution.
However, this outcome has often been vigorously challenged in American
state courts by lower income spouses.
One of the most famous cases challenging equitable distribution is
Wendt v. Wendt,34 where the wife demanded exactly half of the marital
estate that she valued at $100 million.35 After Mrs. Wendt rejected her exhusband’s $8 million settlement and $250,000 in annual alimony, a
Connecticut court awarded her approximately $20 million in one of the
largest divorce rulings in American history.36 She appealed the decision,
seeking half of his future earnings, based on the argument that only an
equal distribution is an equitable one.37
Mr. and Mrs. Wendt were high school sweethearts and married on July
31, 1965, in Wisconsin.38 The plaintiff wife, Mrs. Lorna Wendt, was a
public school music teacher early in their marriage, earning modest
wages.39 After quitting her employment, she had been a mother,

32. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 alternatives A-B (amended 1973), 9A
U.L.A. 288 (1998); Elijah L. Milne, Recharacterizing Separate Property at Divorce, 84 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 307, 310 (2007).
33. See discussion supra Part II.A.; infra Part II.C.
34. No. FA96 0149562 S., 1998 WL 161165 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998), aff’d, 757
A.2d 1225 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
35. See Betsy Morris, It’s Her Job Too Lorna Wendt’s $20 Million Divorce Case is the Shot
Heard ‘Round the Water Cooler, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 2, 1998, http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1998/02/02/237198/index.htm.
Wendt generated much
commentary on the role of a corporate wife. See, e.g., Paul Barett, Wendt Divorce Dissects Job of
“Corporate Wife,” WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1996, at B1, B17.
36. See Morris, supra note 35.
37. Wendt, 1998 WL 161165 at *42.
38. Id. at *1.
39. Id.
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homemaker, and corporate wife.40 The defendant’s husband, Mr. Gary C.
Wendt, was the Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer of GE
Capital Services, Inc.41 The couple had two daughters who were grown and
self-sufficient at the time of the divorce in 1995.42
Mrs. Wendt claimed her contributions to Mr. Wendt’s career entitled
her to half of all his worth because she was his equal partner during the
marriage.43 Specifically, throughout his career, she discussed his work with
him.44 She entertained guests at their multi-million dollar home in
Stamford, Connecticut, and accommodated invitations “to parties in New
York City, out-of-town dinners or a golf engagement.”45 She would occasionally accompany Mr. Wendt on expensive and exotic corporate trips.46
At trial, she described herself as the “ultimate hostess”47 and a “corporate
wife.”48 Additionally, Mrs. Wendt argued that her homemaking marital
contributions entitled her to an equal share of the marital estate.49 She thus
introduced evidence of her care for the children, duties of cooking, and
general maintenance of the household, albeit with hired help.50
Mrs. Wendt’s homemaking contributions were undisputed, as was the
quality of those services.51 However, the court found her view of the
contributions she made to Mr. Wendt’s career to be exaggerated.52 Mr.
Wendt’s contributions to GE and the family finances, however, were extraordinary.53 During his time at GE Capital, the company’s earnings surged
from $271 million to $2.8 billion.54 After hearing testimony on Mr.

40. Id. However, at trial, “The plaintiff offered an expert witness to support her claim that
she is entitled to a substantial distribution in the tens of millions of dollars by reason of giving up
her career as a public school music teacher.” Id. at *21.
41. Id. at *11.
42. Id. at *6.
43. Id. at *19. Mrs. Wendt summarized her view of the legal issues: “Marriage is a
partnership, and I should be entitled to 50%. I gave thirty-one years of my life. I loved the
defendant. I worked hard and I was very loyal.” Id. at *1.
44. Id. at *5.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *13-*14.
47. Id. at *14, *16.
48. Id. at *5.
49. Id. at *1, *19.
50. Id. at *5, *12.
51. Id. at *7.
52. Id. at *16. For example, during a business trip to Poland, “[w]hile the defendant had
meetings and lunches with the Polish Ministry of Finance, a representative of the Polish Center
Bank, the President of the Gdansk Solidarity Bank and other executives, the plaintiff had a 15
minute tour of the city, watched a 20 minute movie in the historical museum and spent from 9:30
a.m. to 1:00 p.m. shopping.” Id.
53. Id. at *8.
54. Id. at *11.
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Wendt’s extraordinary vision for GE and his exceptional leadership skills,
the court found that Mr. Wendt made the most substantial contributions to
GE of all its employees.55
The court ultimately accepted the value of Mrs. Wendt’s non-monetary
contributions to a marriage, stating:
It is widely recognized that the primary aim of property distribution [under the equitable distribution principle] is to recognize
that marriage is, among other things, “a shared enterprise or joint
undertaking in the nature of a partnership to which both spouses
contribute-directly and indirectly, financially and nonfinancially—
the fruits of which are distributable at divorce.”56
Nonetheless, the court recognized that there are multiple factors to property
division, only one of which is contributions. Other potential factors include
the dissipation of assets, the duration of the marriage, and any premarital
agreement between the parties regarding the distribution of the property.57
In Illinois, another state adhering to equitable distribution, the courts may
consider the quality of the homemaker’s contributions and whether the
homemaker had been frugal or extravagant. The courts may also quantify
the homemaker’s contributions.58 The Connecticut Superior Court endorsed this approach in Wendt:
The court must consider all of the statutory criteria in determining
how to divide the parties’ property in a dissolution action. A trial
court, however, need not give each factor equal weight; or recite
the statutory criteria that it considered in making its decision or
make express findings as to each statutory factor.59
In so doing, the Connecticut Superior Court rejected section 4.15 of the
ALI Principles on Family Dissolution60 and the equal division presumption,
noting it cannot become law “until the legislature sees fit to change the
statutes.”61 The court also confirmed the principle of equitable distribution
does not mean equal division. On the contrary, an equitable distribution
often requires an unequal division of marital property, particularly in those
cases where the marital estate grew significantly because of the

55. Id.
56. Id. at *27 (quoting JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL., THE LAW OF EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION § 1.03, at 1-6 (1989)).
57. DiMaggio, supra note 16, at 462. See also infra Part IV.D.
58. DiMaggio, supra note 16, at 463.
59. Wendt, 1998 WL 161165 at *28.
60. See supra Part II.B.
61. Wendt, 1998 WL 161165 at *115. See also id. at *87.
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extraordinary contributions of the higher income spouse.62 The appellate
panel in Wendt affirmed the lower court’s judgment of an unequal property
division, confirming that equitable distribution does not necessarily mean
equal distribution.63
D. PROFESSIONAL DEGREES AS SUBJECT TO PROPERTY DIVISION
Although American courts do not separately address big money divorces as their English counterparts do, their treatment of professional degrees
typically implicates big money couples.64 Many graduate degrees in business, law, and medicine, which generate significant income for their holders, are subject to intense, big money court battles in the United States.65
American cases involving professional degrees are, therefore, somewhat
akin to English big money cases in this way.
Section 4.07 of the ALI Principles, which favors equal division of
property between the spouses, does not consider occupational licenses and
educational degrees as subject to division upon divorce.66 This reflects the
viewpoint of most American jurisdictions, which refuses to treat such assets
as marital property instead of as personal attainment. This view is buttressed by a degree’s characteristic lack of value, nonassignability, and
personal nature.67
New York is, therefore, in the minority in treating professional licenses
as marital assets, dividing their value between spouses as appropriate.68
Other jurisdictions may grant the nonprofessional spouse certain relief in
limited circumstances. If, for example, the husband single-handedly supported the household during his wife’s law school years, he may receive
reimbursement alimony.69

62. See generally, e.g., Young v. Young, No. CA 07-540, 2008 WL 588601 (Ark. Ct. App.
2008); Culver v. Culver, Nos. 2002-CA-001109-MR, 2002-CA-001221-MR, 2004 WL 103024
(Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2004); McHargue v. McHargue, 162 N.C.App. 722 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004);
Lambert v. Lambert, No. 2004-P-0057, 2005 WL 1075737 (Ohio Ct. App. May 6, 2005).
63. Wendt v. Wendt, 757 A.2d 1225, 1230 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
64. See Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution Physics: The Talisman of Time and
Middle Class Law, 31 FAM. L.Q. 93, 93 (1997).
65. Such a battle seems of increasing importance for women with professional degrees.
Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson recently released a study showing that women with business,
law, or medical school degrees are twice as likely to get divorced or separated as their male
counterparts. Sara Schaefer Munoz, Study Finds Women’s MBAs Hazardous to Marital Health,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/2008/04/02/study-finds-womens-mbashazardous-to-marital-health/?mod=WSJBlog#comment-40588.
66. PRINCIPLES, supra note 29, § 4.07.
67. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 708 A.2d 949, 955 (Conn. 1998).
68. See, e.g., O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 751 (N.Y. 1985).
69. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 536 (N.J. 1982) (holding where one
spouse received financial contributions from the other, which were used in obtaining a
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Nonetheless, American courts’ general refusal to divide the value of a
professional degree underscores their reluctance to apportion marital assets
between the spouses equally. The view that the spouse who earned the
degree solely receives its benefit is, therefore, consistent with the American
philosophy that the contributing spouse keeps his or her contribution,
particularly if it is a remarkable one. Such a result, typical in the United
States, makes English divorce law the envy of American lower income
spouses seeking divorces.
III. THE ENGLISH YARDSTICK OF EQUALITY
The English statutory framework on post-divorce property division,
rooted in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, gives courts significant
discretion on the issue.70 Although judges initially used this discretion to
award spouses their reasonable needs and requirements, courts recently
began to favor an equal property division. In 2001, this preference culminated in White v. White, which articulated the yardstick of equality against
which judges now measure their awards.
A. THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR ENGLISH DIVORCE LAW
The English courts’ power to divide marital property upon divorce has
historically been statutorily prescribed.71 Originally, a judge’s ability to
order varying settlements between spouses was found in the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1859, which replaced the old ecclesiastical courts and established the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes.72 Owing to its
patriarchical Victorian roots, however, the 1859 Act limited the courts’
ability to award fair settlements to women.73 Under the 1859 Act, women
also lacked men’s ability to exercise claims against a spouse for adultery,
cruelty, or desertion that led to divorce.74 These limitations on the English
judiciary led the Law Commission to eventually seek reform, resulting in
the current legal regime under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which
provides judges with significant discretion in developing an approach to
post-divorce property divisions.75

professional degree or license with the expectation of deriving material benefits for both spouses,
the supporting spouse may be reimbursed for the amount of such contributions).
70. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18.
71. For a brief but useful history of English statutory divorce law on property division, see
White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) [17-20] (appeal taken from Eng.).
72. Id. at [17].
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18.
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The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973

The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (Act) constitutes the primary legislation underpinning divorce law in the United Kingdom. The most clearly
articulated principle in the Act is the due regard courts must have for the
children of the marriage. Specifically, section 25(2) provides that children
must be placed in the financial position they would have enjoyed had the
marriage not ended.76 In big money cases, this provision is less relevant
because of the abundance of money involved.
The Act is not as lucid, however, on the financial arrangement of the
spouses following divorce.77 Sections 23 and 24 allow the courts to make
financial provision and property adjustment orders. The Act also contains a
checklist guiding the court’s power in dividing the property between divorcing spouses.78 However, the Act does not provide any guidance on the
objectives of post-divorce property division; the section of the Act that

76. Id. § 25(3). The relevant provisions consider:
(a) the financial needs of the child;
(b) the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources
of the child;
(c) any physical or mental disability of the child;
(d) the manner in which he was being and in which the parties to the marriage
expected him to be educated or trained . . . .
Id. § 25(3).
77. As Judge Lord Nicholls declared, “The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 confers wide
discretionary powers on the courts over all the property of the husband and wife.” White, 1 A.C.
596 at [2].
78. Id. at [21]. The exact checklist in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 guiding property
division is:
(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which
each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable
future . . .
(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties
to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the
marriage;
(d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;
(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;
(f) the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the
foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any
contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family;
....
(h) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to
either of the parties to the marriage of any benefit [for example, a pension]
which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will
lose the chance of acquiring.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, c. 18, § 25(2).
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originally provided such guidance was removed.79 That section had mandated that judges exercise their discretion so:
[A]s to place the parties, so far as it is practicable, and having regard to their conduct, just to do so, in the financial position in
which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down
and each had properly discharged his or her financial obligations
and responsibilities towards the other.80
With the deletion of this provision, no explicit objective of post-divorce
property division exists within the Act. Its closest indication is another
section of the Act, section 10, which requires that “the financial provision
made by the petitioner for the respondent is reasonable and fair or the best
that can be made in the circumstances.”81 Courts have also read section
25A as advocating a clean break between the parties.
Although the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 mentions fairness in
property division, it is not mandated as the lone or even primary goal of
property awards.82 Nonetheless, the English courts have particularly valued
fairness as an objective of property division in the absence of explicit
statutory guidance. As Judge Nicholls opined:
Implicitly, the objective must be to achieve a fair outcome. The
purpose of these powers is to enable the court to make fair financial arrangements on or after divorce in the absence of agreement
between the former spouses . . . . The powers must always be
exercised with this objective in view . . . .83
Despite its ambiguities, the Act is the primary statutory element to
English divorce law. As one English judge declared, “Matrimonial Causes
1973 . . . rules the day. And despite the endless judicial gloss which is
applied to it year in and year out at every level it is always best to start and
end in that familiar section.”84 Given the significant judicial discretion
allowed by the Act, however, much divorce law has evolved through the
case law. Not wholly in favor of the consequent direction of English
divorce law, the Law Commission has proposed legislative changes through
the Family Act 1996.

79. White, 1 A.C. 596 at [23].
80. Id. (quoting the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970, c. 45, § 5(1)
[repealed]).
81. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, § 10(3)(b).
82. Id.
83. White, 1 A.C. 596 at [23] (citation omitted).
84. Charman v. Charman, [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1879, [58] (appeal taken from Eng.).
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The Family Act 1996

Drafted by the Law Commission, the Family Act 1996 (Family Act)
was delayed in its complete enactment.85 Nonetheless, the Commission, a
catalyst and guiding force for legal change in England, has often influenced
the divorce law. Thus, it is prudent to be mindful of its recommendations in
considering English divorce law today.
Specifically, Part II of the Family Act introduces new divorce law.86
Part III focuses on publicly-funded mediation, a topic less relevant to ancillary relief.87 Importantly, however, Part I of the Family Act establishes
several principles, the lack of which had characterized divorce law since
1973, when the Commission formulated the Matrimonial Causes Act.
These principles are found in section 1 of the Act and direct the courts to
execute all divorce law in light of these principles.88
Most notably, the overarching principle is the institution of marriage
must be supported. Stated differently, “[D]ivorce law must not undermine
the institution of marriage.”89 The courts, therefore, gain the obligation to
apply divorce law so as to respect and support marriage. Accordingly, the
Family Act includes provisions designed to hinder divorces, such as cooling
off periods before a divorce can be granted.90
Commentators have noted that the principle of respect for marriage
conflicts with some of the incentives provided by a divorce law that favors
equal property division, as English law currently does. First, in big money

85. Family Law Act, 1996, c. 27; GILLIAN DOUGLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO FAMILY LAW
184 (2d ed. 2004).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The exact principles are as follows:
(a) that the institution of marriage is to be supported;
(b) that the parties to a marriage which may have broken down are to be
encouraged to take all practicable steps, whether by marriage counseling or
otherwise, to save the marriage;
(c) that a marriage which has irretrievably broken down and is being brought to
an end should be brought to an end—
(i) with minimum distress to the parties and to the children affected;
(ii) with questions dealt with in a manner designed to promote as good a
continuing relationship between the parties and any children affected as is
possible in the circumstances; and
(iii) without costs being unreasonably incurred in connection with the
procedures to be followed in bringing the marriage to an end; and
(d) that any risk to one of the parties to a marriage, and to any children, of
violence from the other party should, so far as reasonably practicable, be
removed or diminished.
Family Law Act, 1996, c. 27, § 1.
89. DOUGLAS, supra note 85, at 185.
90. Family Law Act, 1996, c. 27, § 1(b).

2010]

ALL’S FAIR IN LOVE AND WAR

131

cases, an equal property division creates a disincentive for the higher income spouse to marry, not only because of the risk of losing significant
assets upon divorce, but also because the laws governing marriage may
unpredictably shift again, as illustrated by the dramatic changes in English
divorce law that resulted in a preference for an equal division91—and premarital agreements are hardly a perfect solution.92 Second, if married,
people’s incentive for professional productivity may be reduced by the
prospect of equal property division upon divorce.93 Moreover, a promise of
equal division incentivizes spouses’ litigiousness because the lower income
spouse will not settle for less than an equal division, while higher income
spouses may view such a division as unfair.94 Finally, any formulaic division, even if creating dissatisfaction, simplifies the divorce process, perhaps
easing a couple’s decision to divorce. In any case, however, the English
statutory framework continues to provide judges with significant discretion
in property divisions, allowing judges to formulate divorce law relatively
unfettered.95 Accordingly, the courts’ interpretation of the statutory framework is the most determinative factor of English divorce law today.
B. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH DIVORCE LAW
One of the consequences, and perhaps advantages, of vesting discretion
in the English judiciary instead of Parliament is that legal change might be
easier to accomplish.96 Judicial discretion has indeed allowed the courts to

91. As one embattled higher income spouse commented, “There is a genuine sense of grievance among rich husbands that they married, in this case in 1976, with the law as it then was, and
are now facing a sea-change wrought in 2000.” Frances Gibb, “I Didn’t Want to Take Him for
Every Penny—I’m Not Greedy,” THE TIMES (London), May 25, 2007, at News 5. On the other
hand, the prospect of an equal property division may discourage the higher income-earner from
divorcing.
92. For one, they are not legally enforceable in England. See infra Part IV.D.
93. See Rebecca Bailey-Harris, The Paradoxes of Principle and Pragmatism: Ancillary
Relief in England and Wales, 19 INT’L J.L. & POL’Y & FAM. 229, 235 (2005). An objective
valuation of spouses’ marital contributions may alleviate this problem. See infra notes 176-79 and
accompanying text.
94. On the other hand, significant judicial discretion may also fuel litigation if the parties
perceive the award as unfair, particularly when the property division is very disproportionate. See
supra Parts II.A., II.C.
95. See generally Burgess v. Burgess, [1996] 2 F.L.R. 34; Calderbank v. Calderbank, [1976]
Fam. 93; Dart v. Dart, [1996] Fam. 607; Daubney v. Daubney, [1976] Fam. 267; Fitzpatrick v.
Sterling Hous. Ass’n Ltd., [1999] UKHL 42, [2001] 1 A.C. 27 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.);
O’Donnell v. O’Donnell, [1976] Fam. 83; P v. P, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 483; Page v. Page, [1981] 2
F.L.R. 198; Piglowska v. Piglowski, [1999] UKHL 27, [1999] 3 All E.R. 632 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.); Preston v. Preston, [1982] Fam. 17; Trippas v. Trippas [1973] Fam. 134; Haldane v.
Haldane, [1977] 2 NZLR 715 (P.C.).
96. But see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 93 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I think it
obvious . . . that we will be ushering in a new regime of judicially prescribed, and federally
prescribed, family law. I have no reason to believe that federal judges will be better at this than
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develop and calibrate divorce law, albeit at the expense of predictability. In
any divorce case before the courts, however, “[o]ne question always arises.
It concerns how the property of the husband and wife should be divided and
whether one of them should continue to support the other.”97 This problem
becomes especially complex in big money cases.
Endowed with statutorily prescribed discretion,98 English judges have
therefore formulated the objectives of divorce law and selected the appropriate model of property division.99 Guided by fairness, English judges
have also developed the legal standards by which to divide property following divorce, although their jurisprudence recently developed in favor of
equal division.100 This preference arises not only in average divorce cases
where such a division is unavoidable by virtue of limited assets, but also in
big money cases, wherein one spouse far out-contributed the other and the
lower income spouse’s needs are comfortably met by a smaller fraction of
the assets.101
1.

Reasonable Needs and Reasonable Requirements

Prior to White in 2001, English courts frequently awarded lower
income spouses only their reasonable needs and reasonable requirements,
which no doubt often overlapped. Page v. Page102 articulated the factors to
be considered in both a “requirements” and a “needs” division: “In a case
such as this ‘needs’ can be regarded as equivalent to ‘reasonable requirements’, taking into account the other factors such as age, health, length of
marriage and standard of living.”103 The interpretation of needs and
requirements was tweaked over the years as English judges sought fair
property divisions.104 For example, the phrase “reasonable requirements”

state legislatures; and state legislatures have the great advantages of doing harm in a more
circumscribed area, of being able to correct their mistakes in a flash, and of being removable by
the people.”).
97. White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) [1] (appeal taken from Eng.).
98. Cf. Matrimonial Property Act 1976 (N.Z.) (prescribing detailed instructions for the
division of property following divorce).
99. See also discussion infra Part IV.B.
100. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
101. See id.
102. [1981] 2 F.L.R. 198.
103. Id. at 201. The view that reasonable requirements equaled reasonable needs was
acknowledged in White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) [30] (appeal taken from Eng.)
(quoting Preston v. Preston, [1982] Fam. 17) (“[T]he word ‘needs’ in section 25(1)(b) [of the
Matrimonial Causes Act] in relation to the other provisions in the subsection is equivalent to
‘reasonable requirements,’ having regard to the other factors and the objective set by the
concluding words of the subsection . . . .”).
104. See FRANCES BURTON, FAMILY LAW 159 (2003) (discussing the meaning of reasonable
needs and requirements under English law).
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was employed in O’Donnell v. O’Donnell,105 where the wife received more
than she strictly needed. Dart v. Dart106 also permitted courts to award
spouses more than their strict needs. In Dart, Lord Justice Thorpe reiterated the factors to determine property division included available assets, the
household’s former standard of living, the spouses’ health and age, each
party’s contributions to the marriage, and the length of the marriage.107
In big money cases, however, lower income spouses were often able to
receive a significant windfall by claiming, as reasonable requirements,
massive awards for exorbitant clothing stipends and other matters extending
well beyond necessity.108 Nonetheless, the reasonable requirements
approach in effect capped the amount a spouse could receive, to the
dissatisfaction of the House of Lords. Specifically, the lower income
spouses could not easily share in the marital assets because they were limited by their reasonable requirements. According to Lord Nicholls, “This
seems then to have led to a practice whereby the court’s appraisal of a
claimant wife’s reasonable requirements has been treated as a determinative, and limiting, factor on the amount of the award which should be made
in her favour.”109
The reasonable requirements standard, therefore, began to encounter
criticism in English law. For example, Lord Nicholls suggested in White
that the standard departed from the statutory language of the Matrimonial
Causes Act.110 In another case, however, the reasonable requirements standard was practically scorned as being too generous:
The husband is genuinely bemused that the wife should regard his
£20m offer as anything other than reasonable, even generous
[given that the wealth was generated entirely by his efforts] . . . .
In the narrow, old fashioned sense that perspective is understandable if somewhat anachronistic. Nowadays it must attract little
sympathy.111
Without an accepted standard of property division, however, English courts
lacked guidance in such cases. The House of Lords provided renewed
105. [1976] Fam. 83.
106. [1996] Fam. 607.
107. Id. These factors are similar to those requiring consideration under the American equitable distribution principle in states such as Illinois and Connecticut. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
108. In the highly emotional context of divorce, some spouses may avenge a divorce by
claiming exorbitant requirements. See, e.g., Katherine A. Kinser & R. Scott Downing, Family Law
Issues That Impact the Professional Athlete, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 337, 361 (1998).
109. White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) [31] (appeal taken from Eng.).
110. Id. at [35].
111. Charman v. Charman, [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1879, [19] (appeal taken from Eng.).
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direction in White v. White, which adopted a yardstick of equality in
property division.
2.

Adoption of the Yardstick of Equality: White v. White

White is the landmark recent case that introduced a strong preference
for equal property division in English divorces. The facts of the case were
relatively straightforward: Mr. and Mrs. White married in 1961.112 They
both had farming backgrounds and throughout their marriage ran a successful dairy farming business in partnership.113 Their farm, Blagroves Farm,
generated marital assets of £3.5 million through its live and dead stock,
machinery, and milk quota.114 Mr. and Mrs. White also farmed Rexton
Farm, located ten miles away from Blagroves Farm and worth £1.25 million, as part of their partnership business.115 Additionally, the couple had
three children.116 The marriage broke down in 1994, and the spouses
divorced in 1997.117 At the time of divorce, the net worth of Mr. and Mrs.
White’s assets totaled £4.6 million, £193,300 of which was owned solely by
Mrs. White and mostly in the form of pension provisions, and £193,300 of
which was owned solely by Mr. White and mostly in Rexton Farm.118
The lower court proceeded on a “clean break basis,” in accordance with
section 25A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as well as with due
regard for Mrs. White’s reasonable needs.119 Mrs. White had argued her
reasonable needs included sufficient money to start her own farm.120 However, the judge deemed this request to be unreasonable, determining it
unjustifiable to fragment the existing, successful farming business so that
Mrs. White could begin her own farm without any guarantees.121 Calculating the wife’s reasonable needs without her requested capital for a new
farm, the judge granted her a fifth of the £4.6 million marital assets.122
Mrs. White appealed, and the court of appeal increased her share to
two-fifths because she had been Mr. White’s equal partner in the farming
business.123 In the course of its judgment, the court of appeal opined the

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

White, 1. A.C. 596 at [4].
Id. at [5].
Id. at [6].
Id. at [7].
Id. at [4].
Id.
Id. at [8].
Id. at [9] (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at [10].
Id.
Id. at [8-9].
Id. at [11].
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starting point should be to divide the assets according to partnership
principles—here, the spouses were equal business partners.124 Additionally,
the court noted there should be an increase in Mrs. White’s share to account
for her contributions as a wife and mother.125 Both spouses appealed: Mrs.
White demanded exactly half of the marital property, and Mr. White sought
the reinstatement of the lower court’s award.126
The House of Lords accepted the appeal and handed down its watershed decision, which altered the direction of big money cases. Lord
Nicholls first rejected the necessity of detailing the partnership stakes between the spouses, instead underscoring that a broad review of their financial situation was more appropriate.127 Second, and more importantly, Lord
Nicholls declared a principle of equality between husband and wife that was
independent of their exact shares in the business.128
However, the House of Lords stopped short of creating a presumption
of equality in property division so as to refrain from offending the intentions of Parliament, whose members had not included such a presumption
in the legislation,129 as their Scottish counterparts had.130 Instead, Lord
Nicholls formulated a yardstick of equality against which judges should
check their property division decisions.131 This represented a break from
the previous reasonable needs and requirements standard.
Notably, White is an unusual case to change the direction of English
big money cases because it is factually atypical in that there is no higher
income spouse. On the contrary, both spouses were nearly equal partners in
the business. To begin the farm, each contributed approximately an equal
amount of capital.132 Eventually, Mr. White’s father favorably loaned them
some additional business capital, although both spouses worked together to
expand and farm the land.133 The whole business was treated as the
property of the partnership between Mr. and Mrs. White. In addition to her

124. Id. at [14].
125. Id. at [11].
126. Id. at [11-12].
127. Id. at [11]. Cf. supra note 23 and accompanying text (likening equitable distribution to
partnership dissolution).
128. White, 1 A.C. 596 at [28].
129. See supra Part III.A.
130. White, 1 A.C. 596 at [27].
131. Id. at [25]. Lord Cooke, in his concurring opinion, doubted whether there was much
distinction between “yardstick” and “guidelines” or “starting point.” Id. at [59]. However, the
House of Lords was concerned that White could create a formal presumption of equality in
practice, with the attendant consequences regarding the burden of proof. Id. at [26].
132. Id. at [5].
133. Id.
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farming duties, Mrs. White also primarily maintained the household.134
Nonetheless, this atypical case—with equal income-earning spouses—
changed the direction of all big money cases, even when one spouse contributed most, if not all, of the marital wealth. White therefore allowed the
courts to divide marital assets equally, even if the award exceeded the most
imaginative reasonable needs or requirements of the lower income spouse.
Therefore, an entrepreneurial high income spouse could no longer provide
just for his or her ex-spouse’s reasonable requirements, no matter how
lavish, but now had to provide the ex-spouse with an equal share of wealth.
Furthermore, despite its particularities, White influenced the future of
not only big money cases, but also of those involving moderate marital
assets.135 Specifically, Lord Nicholls announced a “principle of universal
application” that the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 authorized:
In seeking to achieve a fair outcome, there is no place for discrimination between husband and wife and their respective roles.
Typically, a husband and wife share the activities of earning money, running their home and caring for their children. Traditionally,
the husband earned the money, and the wife looked after the home
and the children. This traditional division of labour is no longer
the order of the day. Frequently both parents work. Sometimes it
is the wife who is the money-earner, and the husband runs the
home and cares for the children during the day. But whatever the
division of labour chosen by the husband and wife, or forced upon
them by circumstances, fairness requires that this should not prejudice or advantage either party when considering . . . the parties’
contributions.136
Accordingly, the yardstick of equality applies to all divorce cases, not just
big money cases. However, its fairness is questioned most by higher
income spouses in big money cases, where there is a significant difference

134. Id. at [14].
135. See generally, e.g., Adams v. Lewis, [2001] All E.R. (D) 274; Elliott v. Elliot, [2000]
EWCA (Civ) 407. The Annual Review of the All England Law Reports noted:
In a previous edition of this Review, it was suggested that modern marriages may
sometimes be described as an equal partnership, but that the Court of Appeal’s
decision in White v. White demonstrated that some marriages are more equal than
others. The decision of the House of Lords [in White v. White] now establishes a
principle of equality for all marriages.
Family Law, 2001 ALL ENGLAND LAW REPORTS ANNUAL REVIEW 219, 219 (2001) (citations
omitted).
136. White, 1 A.C. 596 at [24].
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between the lower income spouse’s reasonable contributions and half of the
marital property.137
Unsurprisingly, White’s dramatic shift toward equal division has encountered criticism. For one, the court wrote White with a broad stroke, not
providing many instructive details to practitioners.138 As a commentator
noted, “[S]hould the yardstick apply only to capital division or to future
income as well?”139 Furthermore, the White decision threatened to produce
unpredictable and confusing case law due to its break from precedent.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the yardstick of equality is favored by the
House of Lords as a justification for equal division, transforming England
into one of the friendliest divorce forums for lower income spouses and
creating a doctrinal split from American divorce law.
3.

The Special Contributions Exception

To avoid harsh results, the yardstick of equality has a special contributions exception.140 This doctrine allows courts to take into account one
spouse’s unique contribution to the marriage, resulting in a higher award to
that spouse.141 However, the doctrine of special contributions is not often
used by English courts.
The doctrine is difficult to apply because English judges have become
uncomfortable with evaluating the parties’ contributions to the marriage.
Originally, big money divorce cases were couched in terms such as the
exceptional or “stellar” contributions of one party.142 The use of such
terminology eventually decreased because of judges’ uneasiness in valuing
137. See infra Part IV.A.
138. Family Law, supra note 135, at 219 (“The decision of the House of Lords [in White v.
White] now establishes a principle of equality for all marriages. In principle, this is a welcome
development. However, in the light of the uncertainty about the implications of the case, Dr.
Stephen Cretney asks: ‘Was it not a trifle rash for the House of Lords to overrule . . . the hitherto
tolerably well-settled practice of the courts?’” (citation omitted)).
139. Bailey-Harris, supra note 93, at 234-35. See also supra note 9.
140. Cf. Wendt v. Wendt, No. FA96 0149562 S., 1998 WL 161165, at *225 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Mar. 31, 1998). Short marriages may also justify a disproportionate division in England. “The
general approach in this type of case should be to consider whether, and to what extent, there is
good reason for departing from equality. As already indicated, in short marriage cases there will
often be a good reason for departing substantially from equality with regard to non-matrimonial
property.” Miller v. Miller & McFarlane v. McFarlane, [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 2 A.C. 618 [55]
(appeal taken from Eng.).
141. Parkinson explains:
The doctrine of special contributions provides that a court is justified in evaluating the
contributions of spouses during the course of the marriage as unequal where the
performance of one spouse in his or her role within the marriage has special features
about it, placing that contribution outside of the norm.
Parkinson, supra note 6, at 164.
142. See, e.g., Cowan v. Cowan, [2001] EWCA (Civ.) 679, [2002] Fam. 97.
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each party’s contributions to a marriage, particularly when one spouse was
in the corporate world and the other was a homemaker. As one English
judge suggested: “But then, the facts having been established, they each
call for a value judgment of the worth of each side’s behaviour and translation of that worth into actual money. But by what measure and using what
criteria?”143 Thus, the courts’ uneasiness with disproportionate property
division has, to a certain extent, undermined the special contributions
doctrine.
Even when a judge applies the special contribution doctrine, the final
property division rarely differs much from an equal split. For example, in
one of the most recent big money cases in England, Charman v.
Charman,144 the special contributions doctrine failed to produce a substantially proportionate division.145 In fact, during the course of that lengthy
litigation, Mrs. Charman conceded not to pursue a share greater than fortyfive percent if a pending case, Miller, upheld the special contribution
doctrine.146 Ultimately, the court awarded Mrs. Charman thirty-six percent
of the marital assets, totaling a £48 million award—one of the largest in
British history.147 She received this award even after her ex-husband provided her with the marital home, substantial provisions for their sons, and
accommodation for her parents.148
Furthermore, in Sorrell v. Sorrell,149 an English court similarly narrowed the special contributions doctrine’s influence, finding a departure
from equality justified by the husband’s special contribution to the marriage
in the form of exceptional business talent amounting to genius.150 Despite
her husband’s brilliant financial contributions to the marriage, the wife was
awarded forty percent of the assets.151 Finally, in GW v. RW,152 the court
concluded “some departure from equality in the instant case was justified
on the basis of the duration of the marriage.”153 Once again, the wife was

143. G v. G, [2002] EWHC (Fam) 1339, [34], 2 F.L.R. 1143, 1155. See also Lambert v.
Lambert, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1685, [2003] Fam. 103 (noting the “breadwinner” does not
necessarily contribute more to the household); Norris v. Norris & Haskins v. Haskins, [2003]
EWCA (Civ) 1084. See also infra Part IV.C.
144. [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1879.
145. Charman, [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1879 at [127].
146. Id. at [13].
147. Frances Gibb, Legal Process in Dock as Judges Rule Ex-Wife Is Worth Record £48
Million Payout, THE TIMES (London), May 25, 2007, at News 4.
148. Id.
149. [2005] EWHC (Fam) 1717.
150. Id. at [2].
151. Id. at [118].
152. [2003] EWHC (Fam) 611.
153. Id. at [1].
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awarded forty percent, illustrating that post-White property division often
resembles an approximately equal split despite the special contributions
doctrine.154
Thus, while the doctrine of special contributions may exempt a higher
income earner from an equal division in theory, many English courts have
restricted its use. Even if one spouse’s special contribution is acknowledged by the courts, the final division does not fall far from an equal division in big money cases, even when such a sum exceeds the most imaginative reasonable requirements held by the lower income spouse. Such a
result differs significantly from the previous outcomes produced under the
measures of reasonable needs and reasonable requirements. The current
state of English law, unfavorable to higher income spouses, provides
several important lessons to American courts.
IV. LESSONS FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
American federalism is often praised for creating the experimental conditions that advance the most efficient solutions.155 The commonalities
between English and American divorce law, which readily facilitate comparison, also create the experimental conditions that invaluably illuminate
the various approaches to family law. The similarities between England
and the United States in property division are striking. First, both systems
routinely resolve divorce cases with similar fact and issue patterns. Second,
each jurisdiction’s statutory divorce law is fundamentally similar to the
others. Third, both judicial systems are bound by divorce legislation providing a substantial amount of judicial discretion, which is particularly true
in the majority of American states that utilize equitable distribution as the
default property regime. Finally, both jurisdictions strive toward the shared
goal of fairness in property division.
Despite these fundamental similarities, however, English courts have
diverged from the majority of American states by embracing equal division.
The result of this doctrinal divergence is most noticeable in big money
cases, heightening the opportunity for a comparison of the two approaches,
as well as their merits and consequences. Such a comparison is indeed
revealing. First, the English courts’ preference for equal division offers a
different judicial interpretation of fairness. Second, isolating the reasons
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“One of
federalism’s chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility
that ‘a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’”) (citing New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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for England’s equal distribution scheme—the courts’ apparent discomfort
in evaluating the spouses’ contributions to a marriage—suggests alternatives for achieving property divisions that better reflect the parties’
contributions to a marriage. Finally, these issues necessarily implicate the
acceptance and use of premarital agreements in the United States, as well as
in England, where such agreements are currently undergoing added scrutiny
in preparation for potential legislative changes.
A. THE MEANING OF FAIRNESS
A comparison of the American and English approaches to post-divorce
property division immediately reveals that, in this context, no universal
definition of fairness exists. The mere fact that different statutory approaches exist in the United States,156 and an entirely different system has
developed in England, illustrates the elusive nature of fairness, as well as
the differing meanings of fairness across jurisdictions.157
Although the articulated goal of English property division may be
fairness, the courts have continued searching for the best method to achieve
it. As Lord Nicholls noted, “fairness, like beauty, lies in the eye of the
beholder.”158 Divorce law has, therefore, changed as quickly as the concept
of fairness, inherently jeopardizing fairness by increasing the law’s unpredictability despite people’s reliance on it.
Furthermore, the English courts’ separate classification of big money
divorce cases may conflict with a fundamental understanding of fairness. It
is difficult to think of another area of law where the definition of fairness
depends on the amount of money involved, which would generally be considered unfair. Nonetheless, as one English court noted:
There may be cases of short marriages where the limited financial
resources of the parties necessarily mean that attention will still
have to be focused on the parties’ needs. That is not so in big
money cases. Then the court is concerned to decide what would
be a fair division of the whole of the assets, taking into account the
parties’ respective financial needs and any need for
compensation.159

156. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. See also supra Part II.B.
157. In the case of mobile couples, this has many implications in the field of conflicts of law,
or the problem of which law to apply when more than one jurisdiction is involved.
158. White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) [1] (appeal taken from Eng.).
159. Miller v. Miller & McFarlane v. McFarlane, [2006] UKHL 24, [55], [2006] 2 A.C. 618
(appeal taken from Eng.).
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In other words, the courts’ perception of fairness plays a lesser role in the
average divorce case because there is no use for discretion with limited
assets. However, while big money divorce cases may certainly present
particular challenges to English courts, it may be inherently unfair to treat
them differently than the remainder of divorce cases.
Finally, the yardstick of equality approach of the English courts
produces property awards that highly depend on the amount of money at
stake, which may produce unfair results. Under the English approach, for
example, a homemaker married to an average-earning spouse will receive a
tiny fraction of a wealthy homemaker’s award, even though they both
performed the same work.160 Therefore, what may be a fair settlement for
an average-earning couple becomes an unfair award if applied to a big
money case. It may be fairer across divorce cases, however, to use a more
objective valuation of each spouse’s marital contribution.161
In practice, many of these issues of fairness implicate only big money
cases. In the average English divorce case, applying the yardstick of
equality to property division would have a result similar to that under a
reasonable needs approach because of the modesty of the divisible assets—
half of these would not exceed the spouse’s reasonable needs. In big
money cases, however, there is necessarily a significant difference between
the lower income spouse’s reasonable needs and half of all divisible
property—raising the important question of which approach produces a
fairer result.
This same observation applies to the American system, which remains
split between the community property and equitable distribution
approaches. In the average American divorce case, there may not be much
practical difference between community property and equitable distribution.
However, when the assets are sizable, the results differ greatly depending
on which approach the court uses in dividing the property. In sum, fairness
acquires different meanings depending on the amount of money at stake and
the particular court’s approach. The English courts have been laboring in
recent years to more precisely develop these nuances of fairness, but the
emerging question for the American judicial system is whether the English
approach produces fair results.
B. THE VARIETY OF PROPERTY MODELS
In the United States, while courts aim to achieve fairness in property
divisions, they must work within the legislative framework mandating
160. This assumes the two homemakers contributed equally to their households.
161. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
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either equitable distribution or community property.162 English courts,
meanwhile, must determine which property model to utilize, within White’s
framework. Therefore, in addition to divergent perceptions of fairness, the
choice of property model or regime influences the results of the property
division because each model compensates the lower income spouse
differently.163
Adopted by a minority of American states and many European civil
law systems, one possible property regime is community property.164 This
model rests on the assumption that marriage is a partnership of equals,165
resulting in relatively equal shares upon divorce.166 As Lord Nicholls of
Birkenhead opined, “The parties commit themselves to sharing their lives.
They live and work together. When their partnership ends each is entitled
to an equal share of the assets of the partnership, unless there is a good
reason to the contrary.”167
Another option is equitable distribution, wherein the equality between
spouses does not necessarily result in an equal sharing of assets at divorce,
but property division must be equitable.168 Specifically, the shares are
determined by factors such as the particular needs of one party or the
children.169 The majority of American states have a statutory default of
equitable distribution.
162. See supra Parts II, IV.A.
163. “Property models” will also be referred to as “property regimes” in this Part.
164. France, Italy, and Poland are examples of European countries wherein the default
property division is some form of community property. KATHARINA BOELE-WOELKI, MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 5 (2000); Elzbieta
Skowronska-Bocian, Family and Succession Law, in INTRODUCTION TO POLISH LAW 85, 96-98
(Stanisław Frankowski ed., 2005). Community property is the default approach in only a minority
of American states, which currently consist of Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See generally Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial
Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53 CLEVELAND L. REV. 359, 370 (2005-2006)
(discussing the community property regime in the nine community property states). See also, e.g.,
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550-56 (West 2007).
165. See DOUGLAS, supra note 85, at 191-92.
166. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY § 1 (2d ed. 1971).
167. Miller v. Miller & McFarlane v. McFarlane, [2006] UKHL 24, [16], [2006] 2 A.C. 618
(appeal taken from Eng.).
168. See supra Part II.A. As one higher income spouse’s attorney argued, “The most important principle which emerges is the identification of the function of the court as being to ascertain
the reasonable requirements of the claimant. If the needs of both parties are satisfied and there is a
surplus it should lie where it falls.” White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) [1] (appeal taken
from Eng.).
169. Miller, 2 A.C. 618 at [142]. See also H v. H, [2007] EWCH (Fam) 459, [2007] All E.R.
(D) 88. However, White emphasized equal division of marital assets is both feasible and fair in
many situations today. See Burgess v. Burgess, [1996] 2 F.L.R. 34 (allowing a doctor and a lawyer
to equally share marital assets because both parties had sufficient incomes to supplement their
halves of the assets); White, 1 A.C. 596 at [143].
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A compensation model of property division aims to compensate
spouses for their contributions to the marriage, as well as their opportunity
costs of doing so.170 For homemaking spouses, their child-rearing work
usually composes a substantial amount of total compensation.171 Property
division may also be driven by the reasonable needs or requirements of the
parties.172 This model is rooted in the idea marriage generates needs for
one party that ought to be met by the other party. This is a common
approach to property division when there is no financial surplus after the
parties’ needs are considered.
English big money divorce cases occasionally exhibit a mixture of
these two latter models, as McFarlane v. McFarlane173 illustrates. In that
case, the House of Lords affirmed the lower courts’ awards, determining
Mr. McFarlane must meet his ex-wife’s annual needs of £128,000, pay her
compensation for the marriage-generated disadvantage she incurred by
quitting her job as an attorney to focus on the family, and pay any surplus
because she was entitled to share it. This judgment illustrates the complications arising in big money property divisions, where the courts must
untangle vast assets and marital contributions.
C. VALUATING THE SPOUSAL CONTRIBUTION
Notably, judicial views on fairness, as well as determinations regarding
property regimes, are often seemingly driven by a reluctance to value
spouses’ contributions to a marriage in monetary terms. English courts in
particular have been recently troubled by evaluating the homemaker’s
contribution to the household.174 According to one such judge, “It has . . .
meant that the court has been asked to examine closely aspects of the psychological dynamic of the marriage partnership in a way nowadays almost
unheard of.”175 The frequent result of such a view has been that property

170. DOUGLAS, supra note 85, at 191. See also Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony,
and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 750 (1993).
171. Under this approach, spousal support is based “on the advantages and disadvantages
flowing from the actual relationship between the parties, rather than from the fact of marriage per
se. It attributes financial value to the reasonably held expectations by the spouse who made the
preponderance of non-monetary contributions or sacrifices that helped the couple achieve their
marital lifestyle.” Claire L’Heureux-Dube, Equality and the Economic Consequences of Spousal
Support: A Canadian Perspective, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12 (1995).
172. DOUGLAS, supra note 85, at 191.
173. [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 2 A.C. 618 (appeal taken from Eng.).
174. American courts do not often exhibit this reluctance when applying the equitable
distribution principle. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the
Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1, 35 n.182 (2008).
175. Charman v. Charman, [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1879, [20] (appeal taken from Eng.).
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division upon divorce resembles an equal division, even if the spouses
contributed varying efforts to the marriage.
The opposite approach would use an economic analysis in divorce
judgments. American courts have been exploring this method, utilizing
traditional human capital theory, market replacement theory, and opportunity cost theory to reach equitable distribution judgments that reflect
spouses’ varying efforts.176 There are particular benefits to evaluating
spouses’ contributions in economic ways. For one, spouses would be better
rewarded and compensated for their marital contributions, providing them
with an incentive to contribute to the marriage in good faith.177 Furthermore, higher income spouses would no longer be compelled into particular
jobs solely to meet high alimony payments, which often, as a rule, cannot
be reduced upon self-imposed changes in salary.178 Finally, property
awards would be more consistent because they would no longer be determined by the income level of the higher earner, but be established by the
valuations of each spouse’s marital contributions—whether they be established by the court or by the legislature.179 If such valuations were publicly
available and clear, as well as predictable, then spouses could also weigh
the differing choices they have in terms of how to contribute to the marriage. Thus, the advantages of an economic analysis of marital contributions may prompt American courts to continue exploring this approach in
order to determine how to achieve the fairest post-divorce property
divisions.
D. PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS
If prospective spouses enter into premarital agreements, such agreements have a potentially vital role in post-divorce property division.180
176. See, e.g., Wendt v. Wendt, No. FA96 0149562 S., 1998 WL 161165, at *25 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998); Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between
Cohabitants, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 734 (2006) (“[D]ivorce proceedings have tended to
become more objective over time.”).
177. A no-fault divorce property division, on the other hand, provides less incentive to
behave within marital norms.
178. American courts in particular base alimony on a formula that combines need and ability
to pay, although self-imposed salary changes do not lower the alimony obligation.
179. For example, state legislatures can prescribe formulas, or guidelines, on how to
calculate each spouse’s marital contribution.
180. For further background on premarital agreements, see generally Developments in the
Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2075 (2003); Julia Halloran
McLaughlin, Premarital Agreements and Choice of Law: “One, Two, Three, Baby, You and Me”,
72 MO. L. REV. 793 (2007); Karen Servidea, Reviewing Premarital Agreements to Protect the
State’s Interest in Marriage, 91 VA. L. REV. 535 (2005); Judith T. Younger, Lovers’ Contracts in
the Courts: Forsaking the Minimum Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 349 (2007).
The premarital agreement is also known as the prenuptial or antenuptial agreement.
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These agreements essentially allow parties to reduce divorce disputes in the
future by contracting around judicial and legislative defaults. Significantly,
prospective spouses may utilize premarital agreements to define fairness in
their property division181 and to establish their property model, removing
the courts and legislatures from those decisions.182 Premarital agreements
also have the power to predetermine rights and responsibilities not only
upon the spouses’ divorce or death, but also during their marriage.
However, premarital agreements are hardly the perfect remedy,
particularly when their enforceability is in doubt. In fact, such agreements
are currently unenforceable in England,183 although courts may consider
them in determining ancillary relief.184 The Law Commission in England
launched a major initiative exploring the status and enforceability of premarital agreements on the subject of property and finances, with a report
and draft bill expected in late 2012.185 In the meantime, the unenforceability of premarital agreements in England may be the reason for their
rarity among marrying couples,186 although such agreements are increasing
in popularity.187
While premarital agreements are more popular in the United States,
they occasionally raise enforceability issues in court upon divorce. Prior to
1970, however, premarital agreements were often considered completely
invalid in the United States on public policy grounds, as they were deemed
to endanger marital stability.188 Florida became the first state in the United
States to accept such agreements in Posner v. Posner.189 Currently, states
have differing positions on the enforceability of such agreements, with
some invalidating premarital agreements that are materially unfair to one
party190 and others exhibiting complete deference to the agreements.191

181. See supra Part IV.A.
182. See supra Part IV.B.
183. For a discussion of premarital agreements in France, Germany, Switzerland, and
Poland, see generally Margaret Ryznar & Anna St pie -Sporek, To Have and to Hold, for Richer
or Richer: Premarital Agreements in the Comparative Context, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 27 (2009).
184. See, e.g., Pre-nuptial and Post-nuptial Agreements, LAW COMMISSION, http://www.
lawcom.gov.uk/marital_property.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
185. Id.
186. One survey found only two percent of married and divorced people in the United
Kingdom had premarital agreements. Divorce Lawyers Braced for Busiest Week Ever, TIMES
ONLINE, Jan. 5, 2009, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article5450552.ece.
187. More Couples Signing Pre-nuptials, BBC, Sept. 26, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/uk_news/8276018.stm (“Family lawyers say they have seen a tenfold increase in recent years in
couples signing pre-nuptial agreements on dividing their assets after divorce.”).
188. See Ryznar & St pie -Sporek, supra note 183, at 30.
189. 233 So.2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970).
190. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act advocates a similar approach. UNIF.
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9 U.L.A. 36 (1983).
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Approximately half of American states, however, have now adopted some
variation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA).192
Interestingly, the general theory underpinning premarital agreements
may undermine the partnership model of marriage, toward which both
England and the United State strive. On the one hand, a court’s ability to
invalidate a contract entered into by equal partners is problematic because
as equals, they should be able to contract.193 On the other hand, if premarital agreements substantially deprive parties of equal shares, they hinder
the spouses’ equality. Some commentators have suggested that premarital
agreements must move in the direction of dividing property equally, or else
the agreements are at odds with the view of marriage as a partnership.194
Accepting this proposition, however, would defeat the entire purpose of a
premarital agreement, which is to provide parties a method of contracting
around court defaults.
Therefore, the favorable treatment of premarital agreements in the
United States, which permits significant freedom of contract, recognizes
spousal equality by acknowledging each spouse’s ability to contract.195
Furthermore, the philosophy pervading American family law acknowledges
that different people make differing contributions to marital life, thereby
permitting people to enter into premarital agreements reflecting their
various contributions. On the contrary, England’s approach precludes the
acknowledgment of the differing contributions of spouses, without
guaranteeing them the contractual freedom to opt-out of such judicial and
legislative defaults.

191. Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 168 (Pa. 1990).
192. Charles W. Willey, Effect in Montana of Community-Source Property Acquired in
Another State (and Its Impact on a Montana Marriage Dissolution, Estate Planning, Property
Transfers, and Probate), 69 MONT. L. REV. 313, 365 (2008). For examples of various states’
UPAA laws, see CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (West 2004), 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1 (1990), and
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-17-6 (1956).
193. Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, supra note 180, at 2077.
194. Id. at 2096. One article provides:
This section expands on the argument that deference to freedom of contract in
antenuptial agreement law is undesirable. It argues that acknowledgment of the partnership conception of marriage demands that parties desiring to execute antenuptial
agreements approximate the fifty-fifty division implicit in the partnership approach or
stand prepared to prove the agreements’ substantive fairness at the time of divorce.
Id.
195. For further background on the American premarital agreement, see Ryznar & St pie Sporek, supra note 183, at Part II.
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V. CONCLUSION
Judges in England and the United States have been encountering big
money cases with increasing frequency in recent years. While both legal
systems have pursued fairness in their division of post-divorce property,
each has taken drastically different routes—especially in big money cases.
Most American courts have employed the principle of equitable distribution, which frequently results in a disproportionate property division,
particularly when the marital estate grew due to the efforts of one talented
spouse. England, on the other hand, recently implemented a yardstick of
equality in White that produces near equal property division in many cases.
While this shift does not significantly change the property awards in
average divorce cases, lower income spouses in big money marriages
receive far more than they would reasonably need or require. Furthermore,
this shift has created a significant doctrinal split from American law.
Such recent developments in English law would be equivalent to a
move by most American states from equitable division to community
property. Although such a change of law has not occurred in the United
States, many lower income spouses have challenged their disproportionate
shares of marital property in state courts. The English divorce regime
would be ideal to such spouses, but the clamor for divorce reform in
England provides some support for the American equitable distribution
principle.196 In many big money cases, however, the lower income spouse
is already well situated under any approach and an absolutely equal division
becomes only a matter of principle. The dispositive question therefore
becomes whether a legal system should aim to treat all spouses and
contributions equally, or to permit exceptional contributors to retain the
financial rewards of their work after providing for their former spouses.

196. See supra Part III.A.2.

